CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS IN UNITED STATES
CORPORATION LAW
By Richard A. Booth
This article focuses on corporation law in the United States as it
relates to capital contributions and capital maintenance. In other
words, this article addresses the provisions of corporation law relating
to (1) the obligation of investors to contribute to the corporation a
specified amount of capital and (2) the obligation of the corporation to
maintain a specified amount of capital (and not to pay it back to the
stockholders in the form of dividends or payments to repurchase or
redeem shares).Traditionally, the amount of capital that must be
contributed to and maintained by a corporation is called the legal
capital of the corporation.1 Thus, I refer here to the rules relating to
these matters as legal capital rules.
It is important to recognize that corporation law in the United
States is state law. There is no general federal corporation law,
although there are a few federally chartered corporations. And there is
no federal common law relating to corporations.
The legal capital rules vary widely from state to state. Indeed, it
is arguable that the legal capital rules differ more from one state to
the next than any other feature of corporation law. Accordingly, it is
fair to say that there is little agreement among lawmakers as to the
rationale for and wisdom of such rules. It is also fair to say, however,
that few American legal scholars perceive that these rules are
important. Few bother to focus on them in their law school classes,
and few publish any significant scholarship on the subject. On the
other hand, the subject is quite interesting from an historical
perspective and offers important insights into how corporation law
evolved in the United States.
The legal capital rules such as they are apply only to
corporations. There are no legal capital rules applicable to other forms
of organization such as partnerships and limited liability companies
(although there are few very general default rules about capital
accounts in connections with these forms of organization).
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This article is divided into three parts. First, I outline the history
and evolution of legal capital rules in the United States. Although these
rules have been de-emphasized in recent years, particularly in the
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) and the states that follow it,
the legal capital rules remain on the books of numerous states and
continue to be litigated from time to time. Second, I describe and
analyze the legal capital rules currently in force in the major
commercial jurisdictions, including Delaware, New York, and California.
In addition, I will describe the rules as currently set forth in the MBCA.
Again, there are remarkable variations in the rules from state to state.
For example, as I discuss further below, California requires its
corporations to maintain a balance sheet conforming to generally
accepted accounting principals (GAAP) and limits the payment of
dividends to either retained earnings or assets in excess of 125
percent of liabilities. Delaware, on the other hand, permits dividends
without reference to a formal balance sheet. For example, under
Delaware law a corporation may pay a dividend to the extent that
going concern value exceeds long term debt and stated capital. Third,
I describe the various rules that have taken the place of the legal
capital rules in the United States. These include federal securities law,
fraudulent transfer statutes, bulk sale statutes, veil piercing doctrine,
successor liability doctrine, fiduciary duty doctrine relating to
corporations operating on the edge of insolvency, and a variety of
corporation statutes relating to particular transactions such as sales of
assets and dissolution. (I do not address any industry-specific capital
rules such as those relating to banks, brokers, or insurance
companies.)
I.

HISTORY & EVOLUTION OF LEGAL CAPITAL RULES

The best way to understand corporation capital requirements in
the United States is to consider the matter from an historical
perspective. Prior to 1811, one could not form a corporation except by
legislative act. In that year, New York enacted legislation permitting
the formation of manufacturing corporations without specific legislative
action.2 In 1845, Louisiana adopted a new constitution that prohibited
the legislative charter of corporations, apparently as a result of the
perception that legislative charters smacked of privilege and elitism.3
Whatever the reason, it presumably became necessary to set up more
2
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or less standard rules relating to the amount of capital that must be
contributed to a corporation in order for it to commence doing
business. In the days of legislative charters, such matters could be
individually negotiated according to the nature of the business. With
incorporation under a general act, one needs rules.
In 1875, New Jersey enacted the first general corporation
statute. That statute was revised in 1896, among other things, to
permit one corporation to hold the shares of another and thus to
permit the formation of so-called trusts such as Standard Oil. This
statute was copied virtually verbatim by Delaware, where it was
enacted in 1899. In 1913, under the leadership of Governor Woodrow
Wilson, New Jersey eliminated several of the more liberal provisions of
its corporation law, leaving Delaware as a more attractive place to
incorporate, a position that it has maintained since that time.4
It is widely believed that the various states compete with each
other to attract corporations. 5 Although such competition does not
appear to be a problem in other areas of the law, it is perhaps
understandable that corporation law is different in that the
corporations of one state are essentially free to operate in all states.
Thus, many observers have suggested that the dilution of substantive
rules such as those relating to legal capital may be attributable to
destructive competition and the so-called race to the bottom in
corporation law as each state competes to attract corporations by
eliminating restrictions on their activities. Nevertheless, it is important
not to jump to conclusions about the temptation of states to compete
with each other. Indeed, several studies indicate that stock price tends
to be higher for Delaware corporations than for corporations of other
states, which suggests that stockholders (at least) may view the
supposedly lax Delaware rules as better than those of other states.6
There is no reason to think that the states would not compete with
each to offer the best possible legal product. Thus, although it may be
tempting to assume that the demise of the legal capital rules is an
example of increasing laxity in corporation law, it may also be the case
that such rules proved to be inefficient and that other more efficient
rules have evolved.
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In any event, after the advent of free incorporation, state law
required (1) that the charter of a corporation to be formed specify
some minimum amount of capital for which subscriptions must be
obtained and (2) that some specified portion of this amount in fact be
paid before the corporation could legally commence doing business.7
Many of these provisions were included in state constitutions. Many of
these statutes remained in force through the 1920s and a few
persisted until later particularly in more heavily regulated businesses.
Presumably, state corporation commissioners reviewed the proposed
amounts in much the same fashion as they would later review the
merits of a securities offering. Presumably, these requirements were
seen as the quid pro quo for limited liability. In other words, they were
likely seen as a way to protect creditors who could not pursue their
claims against the assets of individual stockholders if a business failed
as they would be able to do against partners in an ordinary
partnership.8 Nevertheless, it is not clear that the rules relating to par
value and watered stock were intended to protect creditors. Rather,
they may have been intended to assure equal treatment among
subscribing stockholders, a function that was largely supplanted by the
federal Securities Act of 1933.
In addition, most states placed limits on the maximum amount
of capital that a corporation could raise from the sale of stock.9 In
many cases, these limitations varied according to the nature of the
business. New York abolished such limitations in 1890, but they
persisted in several states into the 1920s and beyond.10 Limits on the
maximum amount of capital that a corporation might raise were
undoubtedly the vestige of popular suspicion about the mystical idea
that a corporation could have the legal status of a person and possibly
even the older worry that corporations were an arm of the state. In
any event, state corporation statutes combined provisions that were
designed both to assure that a corporation raised sufficient capital for
its purposes and to prevent the amassing of too much capital (and
presumably power). The fact that corporation law sought to
7
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accomplish both of these ends undoubtedly confused matters among
lawmakers and gave rise to many opportunities for messy
compromises.
In any case, given the minimum capital requirements, it was
necessary for an entrepreneur who sought to form a corporation for
purposes of conducting business (usually called a promoter in the older
cases) to specify in advance the number of shares to be sold and the
price at which those shares would be sold. Practically speaking,
investors would not likely invest unless they knew these facts.
Moreover, this system had the effect of ensuring that all investors
would be treated more or less equally at least in the initial round of
share sales. (And various other rules made it difficult to sell additional
shares later anyway.) It seems fairly clear that the idea of par value
came from this practical necessity. Although it is now obvious that
setting par at the price at which one expects to sell shares can be
unduly confining if it later becomes necessary to sell more shares, it is
understandable that in the early days promoters gave little thought to
the possible need for a subsequent issue of shares because of the
relatively low limits that many states placed on maximum capital.11
This system also required a special rule relating to contracts to
sell shares. It is the corporation that must issue shares. But the
corporation may not exist at the time an investor agrees to invest. In
such circumstances, there is no counterparty to the investor’s
agreement to invest. Therefore, there is no enforceable contract. Thus,
the states enacted statutes that made subscription agreements
enforceable by the corporation to be formed for some specified period
of time. These statutes remain on the books in most states, but they
are rarely used today, because it is very easy to form a corporation,
and because a share subscription constitutes an offering of securities
under the 1933 Act, which therefore must be registered.12
This system also had the effect of protecting creditors or at least
affording them a possible remedy. If the corporation became insolvent,
creditors could pursue subscribers who had not yet paid for their
shares. In addition, if a promoter failed to garner sufficient
11
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subscriptions or payments, but began to do business in the name of
the corporation anyway, the promoter could be held personally liable
for the debts of the business.13
In addition to rules relating to the minimum amount of capital
that must be paid in before commencing business, corporation law
limited the nature of the capital that could be contributed. It seems
fairly obvious that one way to circumvent the requirement of payment
for shares pursuant to a subscription would be to pay with a
promissory note, in effect substituting one obligation for another.
Some states appear to have required that contributions be in cash,
though most states ultimately adopted statutes that prohibited
payment in the form of a promise to pay or a promise of future
services.
The par value system was passable for purposes of assuring
equal treatment among new stockholders, but it failed to protect new
stockholders from promoters who might have sold themselves stock on
the cheap before selling stock to the general public. In such a case, a
new stockholder has no standing to sue, because the corporation is
presumed to have assented to the terms on which it sold stock and the
new stockholder is presumed to have paid a fair price for his stock.14
Undoubtedly part of the problem lay in the fact that promoters
had begun seeking capital from strangers who had little access to
information about the businesses being promoted. As a result of this
13
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problem the states began to pass so-called blue sky laws. The first
such law was enacted by Kansas in 1911.15 Within a short period of
time virtually every state had some such law. In most cases, these
laws empowered the state securities commissioner to review the
merits of an offering, and to prohibit the sale of investments that were
found not to be fair, just, and equitable to investors. Hence, the
system came to be known as merit regulation. State blue sky laws had
numerous problems. For one, it was difficult for a securities
commissioner to pursue unscrupulous promoters across state lines.
Accordingly, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933.16
Unlike most state blue sky laws at the time, the 1933 Act mandates
only disclosure.17 It establishes a system under which an offeror must
file a registration statement with the Securities & Exchange
Commission, disclosing all material facts about an offering, including
any prior issuance of stock to promoters. In addition, a prospectus
(which is essentially a copy of the registration statement without the
exhibits) must be delivered to every investor. Finally, the 1933 Act
provides straightforward remedies for investors if the issuer
misrepresents or fails to disclose any material fact about the offering.
In effect, the 1933 Act solved the stockholder standing problem by
giving the stockholder a more or less absolute right to get back his
money. It also swept away most of the rationale for the par value
system (as far as stockholders are concerned) in that it effectively
required that public offerings be conducted by the sale of a fixed
amount of stock at a fixed price per share.18
Another well recognized problem with the par value system was
that it could create difficulties in connection with subsequent offerings
of stock. Suppose that a company set its par value at $100 per share
15
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and sells the entire initial offering at that price. Five years later,
market prices generally have fallen by 30 percent, and the shares of
the company are selling for $70. Given that most companies tend to
follow the market up and down, one would expect the stock to be
trading at $70 even if the business has performed as expected. The
company wants to sell additional shares, but its charter requires that
the shares be offered at $100 -- which no investor will pay. There was
some authority to the effect that a corporation could sell shares at less
than par under such circumstances, but it was arguably limited to
situations in which the corporation would otherwise fail.19
The obvious solution to this problem is to amend the charter to
reduce par value to $70 or some lower number. But there appears to
have been a strict rule against reducing capital.20 As a result of this
problem, New York amended its corporation law in 1912 to permit the
use of no par stock.21 Despite the name, no par stock is still very much
part of the par value system. The general rule with no par stock is that
the stock may be sold for any amount set by the board of directors,
but the entire amount received for stock must be treated as stated
capital.22
It is fairly clear that neither the ability to amend the charter to
reduce par value nor the practice of issuing low par stock was
widespread or even extant as of 1912. But it is not surprising that
after 1933 corporations began to issue stock with a low par value
simply to plan for the possibility of further sales of stock in the future.
After all, the 1933 Act effectively protected investors against
overpayment and dilution far better than the par value system had
done. Neither is it surprising that although the states could have
eliminated the par value rules at this point -- if the only concern was
equal treatment among stockholders -- they were probably reluctant
to eliminate the par value requirement entirely because of the rights
that creditors had come to enjoy. Nevertheless, those protections had
become quite slim.
19
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The par value system had other another independent set of
implications for dividends (distributions of property) to stockholders.23
In the traditional system, the corporation could make distributions to
its own stockholders only to the extent that it had generated profits -funds in excess of its capital. To return capital would in effect violate
the par value system by permitting stockholders to pay par formally at
the outset and then to get a rebate of some of the money. Thus, the
par value system required rules about distributions. To borrow a
phrase from trust law, the most basic rule was in essence that a
corporation could not invade capital to pay a dividend. Practically
speaking this meant that the corporation could pay dividends only out
of profits. But there were many variations on this basic theme, as I
discuss further below.
One problem with a strict rule against invasion of corporate
capital is that sometimes a corporation may raise more capital than it
needs. Presumably, the corporation should be able to refund unneeded
capital to its stockholders. Arguably it might even be required to do
so.24 So a strict non-invasion rule might be too strict. In any event,
the rules relating to distributions offered (some) creditor protection in
addition to the rules relating to the issue of stock.
The point for present purposes is that there were two somewhat
independent but related rationales for the par value system: regulation
of stock issuance and regulation of distributions to stockholders. Taken
together, they must have appeared to be good reasons not to do away
with the par value system altogether despite the increasingly common
practice of using low par stock. In effect, the idea may have been to
permit corporations to specify some amount of minimum capital that
would be raised and maintained, but it is unclear that by 1950 either
stockholders or creditors placed much reliance on these rules.
II.

LEGAL CAPITAL IN CURRENT PRACTICE

Legal capital rules vary widely from state to state, but there are
essentially five models in common use. I classify these according to
23
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the rules relating to ordinary distributions to stockholders. The 1950
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) follows an earned surplus rule.
The 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) follows a
simple balance sheet rule.25 Both Delaware and New York follow simple
surplus rules. California follows a percentage test. Finally,
Massachusetts has no balance sheet rules at all. I discuss each of
these schemes below.
1950 Model Business Corporation Act
In the early 1940s, the Committee on Corporate Laws of the ABA
Section of Business Law began work on the Model Business
Corporation Act. There were several reasons for the development of
the MBCA. There was a perception that the federal government was
likely to call for a uniform federal incorporation law. There was also a
perception that Delaware law was too management friendly and that
there was a need for a statute that gave more weight to the interests
of stockholders. And undoubtedly there was a need for more organized
statute (with commentary) that might make some sense out of the
various state statutes that had evolved in a somewhat random
fashion.26
The 1950 Model Act was quite influential and came to be
followed in whole or large part by as many as thirty-five states before
it was revised in 1984. It continues to be followed in several states
today. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the MBCA was
developed and continues to revised and updated by a committee of the
ABA. Although it has been widely followed by the states, it has no
independent legal status.27 In any event, this model statute, which
25
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came to be widely followed, gives a good snapshot how corporate
lawyers thought at that time. The 1950 Model Act reflects what were
seen as best practices at the time.28 Today, the 1950 Model Act may
be seen as fairly simple statement of the traditional par value rules.
Under the 1950 Model Act, the articles of incorporation must
specify a par value for shares and must specify the maximum number
of shares that may be issued.29 There is no minimum par value for
common shares. If the shares are to have special rights – such as
preferred shares – those rights must be spelled out with specificity.30
The 1950 Model Act also permits no par shares.31
Shares with par value may be issued at any price determined by
the board of directors but only if the price is at least equal to the par
value of the shares.32 In other words, a stockholder who acquires
newly issued shares from the corporation must pay at least par for
those shares. Notwithstanding the express requirement that a
stockholder pay at least par for shares, the 1950 Model Act makes it
clear that the stockholder is obligated to pay the agreed consideration
for the shares and that when the agreed consideration is paid the
shares are deemed to be fully paid and non-assessable.33
The idea behind this provision is that is that the stockholder
should be protected against a claim that the board of directors may
have sold shares too cheaply. The provision does not purport to
protect the board of directors against a possible claim that it sold
shares too cheaply. It is also worth noting that the provision that
deems shares to be fully paid and non-assessable is significant in that
the law of some states (for example, California) presumed that shares
were assessable until well into the 1900s.34
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The 1950 Model Act provides that a stockholder or subscriber is
under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors other than to pay
the agreed price for shares to the corporation.35 This provision is
ambiguous on several levels and probably intentionally so. It is clear
that the obligation to pay runs to the corporation, but the provision
does not necessarily preclude action by a creditor on behalf of the
corporation. And indeed some states permit creditors to maintain a
derivative action. It does not appear that the creditors may sue and
recover directly. Practically speaking, creditors are likely to sue only if
the corporation is insolvent. If so, the corporation will likely be in the
hands of a receiver or bankruptcy trustee who can sue in the name of
the corporation anyway. Thus, it does not appear that it makes much
difference whether the creditors have standing to enforce the pay-in
obligation. The 1950 Model Act makes no distinction between the
portion of the payment equal to par value and any excess amount that
a stockholder may have agreed to pay. Some state statutes suggest
such a distinction and even suggest that creditors may sue directly for
such amounts but not for amounts in excess of par value. 36
Under the MBCA, shares that have been validly issued by a
corporation and then reacquired by it are classified as treasury
shares.37 These shares are treated as if they are still outstanding in
the hands of a stockholder (except for the fact that the shares cannot
be voted). None of the legal capital rules relating to the pay-in
obligations of stockholders apply in connection with the subsequent
(re)disposition of treasury shares. Treasury shares may be sold for any
amount or form of consideration (on the theory that a stockholder
could resell shares for any amount or form of consideration).
The 1950 Model Act includes the usual restrictions on the form of
payment for shares. Promissory notes and future services are
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prohibited as payment, but payment may be in the form of tangible or
intangible property.38
The 1950 Model Act included a provision requiring minimum paid
in capital of $1000 before a corporation might lawfully commence
doing business. That provision was eliminated in 1969.39 Thus, the
Model Act has never included a significant minimum pay in
requirement in addition to the minimal protections afforded by the par
value rules.
The 1950 Model Act includes detailed definitions and rules
relating to the legal capital accounts that must be set up and
maintained by a corporation in the equity portion of the balance sheet.
These include stated capital, capital surplus, and earned surplus. In
essence, stated capital is the amount paid for stock that equals the par
value of the stock, capital surplus is any additional amount that is paid
in (or otherwise generated on the balance sheet), and earned surplus
is surplus that arises from profitable operations. That is, earned
surplus is essentially the same thing as retained earnings under
GAAP.40 The 1950 Model Act does not require that the corporation
adhere to any particular accounting method in making the
determination that a dividend or distribution may be paid.41
The dividend rules under the 1950 Model Act are quite complex
and difficult to summarize. All dividends and distributions are subject
to a solvency requirement. That is, the dividend may not render the
corporation unable to pay its bills as they become due.42
There are in essence four separate sets of rules applying to
distributions under the 1950 Model Act.
Ordinary Dividends

38
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Ordinary dividends may be paid out of earned surplus (retained
earnings) only.43 There is an optional provision that permits
distribution also out of current earnings (a nimble dividend), which
may be important for a corporation that has built up losses over
several years but that has become profitable more recently. The
statute also permits dividends to the extent of depletion or
amortization for wasting assets corporations.
Return of Capital
Dividends may be paid out of capital surplus if the articles of
incorporation permit it or if the distribution is approved by stockholder
vote.44 No such distribution may be made if it would reduce remaining
net assets below aggregate outstanding liquidation preferences.
Repurchases
A corporation may repurchase its own shares to the extent of
earned surplus (or capital surplus if the articles of incorporation permit
or the stockholders approve).45 In other words, the rules here are
essentially the same as those that apply to ordinary dividends.
Redemptions
A corporation may redeem redeemable shares as long as net
assets are not reduced below the liquidation preferences attributable
to shares with equal or prior rights.46 This is the most liberal standard
in the MBCA. Theoretically, the corporation could even invade stated
capital to redeem redeemable shares.
Practically speaking, the above rules boil down to a rule that a
corporation may not invade stated capital to make distributions to
stockholders. Capital surplus is freely available if the articles of
incorporation so state or if the stockholders approve. Thus, these rules
afford little protection to creditors. Moreover, stated capital may be
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reduced by an ordinary amendment to the articles of incorporation
which can also be achieved by a simple stockholder vote.47
Despite the fact that the legal capital rules do little to protect
creditors, the solvency test which overarches all of the various balance
sheet tests, affords some genuine protection for creditors, although it
is unclear that it adds any level of protection beyond that provided by
state fraudulent conveyance and fraudulent transfer laws (which
similarly are based on both equitable solvency and balance sheet
tests). On the other hand, the intricate balance sheet rules may afford
important protections among various classes of stockholders.
If a dividend is paid illegally, the directors who assented to it
(that is, those who failed to register an express objection) are liable to
the corporation for the illegal portion of the dividend, and stockholders
who receive a dividend knowing that it is illegal are liable in
contribution to the directors who are held liable.48
In addition to the foregoing, rules relating to distributions of
cash and property, there are elaborate rules relating to the distribution
by a corporation of its own shares. For the most part, these rules
specify how stated capital should be augmented when stock is issued
under a stock dividend or in connection with a merger or other
fundamental change.49
1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act
The MBCA was thoroughly revised in 1984 (although many of the
substantive changes had been effected by the 1980 amendments to
the earlier version of the act). All references to par value (and shares
without par value) were eliminated.50 This also had the effect of
eliminating capital accounts. The RMBCA also eliminates rules relating
to the form of payment that may be used for shares. The RMBCA
retains the somewhat ambiguous rule that a purchaser of shares is not
liable to the corporation or its creditors except for the amount agreed
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to be paid for shares.51 In addition, the RMBCA eliminates all reference
to treasury shares. Shares reacquired by the corporation become
authorized but unissued shares.52
The RMBCA adopts a single unified test for all distributions.53
There is no special rule relating to repurchases or the redemption of
redeemable shares under the RMBCA. As under the earlier act, this is a
two part test consisting of a balance sheet and solvency test. As under
the earlier act, the solvency test simply requires that the corporation
remain able to pay its bills as they become due. The balance sheet test
is greatly simplified (due in large part to the elimination of the various
capital accounts). In essence, the test is simply that assets must be at
least equal to liabilities after giving effect to the distribution.54 The
RMBCA retains and extends the requirement that liquidation
preferences (if any) be treated as roughly equivalent to stated capital.
In other words, a corporation may not make a distribution to common
shares if the distribution would decrease assets to an amount less than
liabilities plus liquidation preferences on preferred shares. This rule
was limited to dividends out of capital surplus under the 1950 Model
Act but is extended to all distributions under the 1984 Act. But the
RMBCA permits waiver of this rule in the articles of incorporation.
The RMBCA specifies that repurchase debt – a promissory note
given by the corporation in payment to a stockholder selling his shares
back to the corporation – is on par with (ranks equal to) third party
debt if the corporation is able to satisfy the balance sheet test as to
the full amount of debt at the time of repurchase. The case law has
been in conflict on this point. In some cases, stockholders who have
resold their shares to the corporation in good faith have seen the notes
they received subordinated to obligations to third parties because of
vague notions that a selling stockholder should rank after third party
creditors. The approach taken by the RMBCA is essentially that if the
corporation could have distributed the cash up front, the debt should
be treated as equal to any third party creditor claim, on the theory
that the selling stockholder could have lent the money back to the
corporation.
51
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If the corporation is unable to satisfy the balance sheet test as to
the entire amount of repurchase debt at the time of repurchase, the
RMBCA also permits repurchase using debt with a payment contingent
on satisfying the balance sheet test as each payment comes due. The
RMBCA makes it clear that such a debt does not itself count as debt for
purposes of the balance sheet test.55 Subsequent amendments have
also made it clear that interest on contingent debt would be treated as
a distribution (rather than as true interest) and must meet statutory
tests.56
These provisions relating to stockholder debt may well be among
the most important innovations contained in the RMBCA. Prior to the
promulgation of the 1984 Act, the status of such debt was often
unclear. Thus, it is not entirely fair to say that these provisions
necessarily favor stockholders at the expense of creditors. Rather,
they simply clarify the situation and presumably facilitate the ability of
stockholders and creditors alike to negotiate protections more
effectively.57
The RMBCA eliminates financial tests for stock dividends and
stock splits. It treats these distributions as new issues of stock subject
only to limitations on the distribution of shares of one class to holders
of another class.58
The 1984 Model Act retains the rule that the board of directors
may use any reasonable method to determine assets and liabilities and
makes it clear that this determination may be based on a fair valuation
or other method that is reasonable under the circumstances.
Delaware General Corporation Law
Delaware is the most important source of state corporation law
in the United States at least for publicly traded corporations. About
half of all publicly traded corporations are incorporated there. As a
result, the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) applies to the
55
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internal affairs of these corporations. Accordingly, most of the
important judicial decisions relating to corporation law come from the
Delaware courts. Although the courts of other states, as well as federal
courts, may render decisions governed by Delaware law, the Delaware
Court of Chancery is more or less dedicated to disputes involving
corporation law – together with the law of other forms of business
organization. As a result, this court is quite efficient with regard to
such disputes, and litigants tend to prefer to litigate there, which also
has the effect of concentrating business disputes in that forum.
Delaware continues to follow traditional legal capital rules, but
with several important twists. A Delaware corporation must specify a
par value for its shares (or that the shares are without par value).
Shares may not be issued by the corporation for any amount less than
par value. Limitations on the form of payment for shares are limited to
the amount paid to cover par value. In other words, future services
and promissory notes may be used to pay for any amount over and
above par value that is paid for shares.
Although most observers had assumed that treasury shares
could be sold (reissued) for any amount and for any form of
consideration, a recent decision suggests that treasury shares are
subject to the same restrictions on payment of at least par value as
are newly issued shares.59
A Delaware corporation may pay dividends (and repurchase
shares) to the extent of surplus or to the extent of net profits from the
current or preceding year.60 There is no explicit solvency test in the
DGCL. The term surplus is defined as the amount by which net assets
exceed capital.61 (Presumably, the term net assets is the amount by
which assets exceed liabilities, and the term capital refers to stated
capital, that is, aggregate par value of shares outstanding. Thus,
Delaware law permits a corporation to pay dividends to the extent that
assets exceed liabilities plus stated capital.) The courts frequently refer
to this test as an impairment of capital test. In other words, Delaware
law makes no distinctions among sources of surplus. Thus, under the
DGCL a corporation may use additional paid in capital (APIC) to pay a
59
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dividend or repurchase shares. In effect, the DGCL combines a simple
surplus test with a very liberal earned surplus test and permits a
corporation to use either test.
A dividend may not be paid out of net profits (nimble dividend) if
capital representing preferred shares is impaired. On the other hand, it
is generally agreed that under Delaware law a liquidation preference
does not constitute capital.62
There is a special rule for corporations engaged primarily in the
business of exploiting so-called wasting assets such as natural
resources, patents, or copyrights, or the liquidation of specific assets.
Such companies may in essence add accumulated depreciation,
amortization, or depletion to net profits for purposes of calculating
dividend paying capacity. The rationale for this decision is that such a
company generates profits in effect by using up its assets. Potential
profits are thus offset by a decrease in assets such that the company
may never show any retained earnings even though the business is
quite successful. This exception is presumably limited to dividends
based on net profits.63
Delaware law permits net assets to be calculated in any
reasonable manner. There is no requirement that the corporation
adhere to GAAP or any other specific accounting method. Thus, a
corporation may revalue assets at current value or fair market value
for purposes of calculating net assets even though GAAP requires
historical cost.64 To be sure, any such revaluation must be undertaken
in good faith and should thus include a consistent and comprehensive
review of both assets and liabilities and not merely a selective write up
of particular assets. It is also clear that the board of directors may rely
on outside experts such as accountants.
The Delaware courts have taken a broad view of board discretion
in this area. For example, in one recent case, Klang v. Smith's Food
62
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and Drug Centers Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court approved the
calculation of net assets based on a valuation of discounted cash flow
(DCF) less long term liabilities.65 As the court recognized, this test
ignores the balance sheet altogether or rather permits the use of
projected future earnings to construct an alternative balance sheet. In
effect, Klang conflates the two separate tests based on net assets and
net profits into one. It is quite contrary to the traditional rule.66
New York Business Corporation Law
The New York Business Corporation Law (NYBCL) was
substantially revised in 1998, but despite trends to the contrary, New
York law retains most of the traditional rules relating to legal capital.
New York law continues to require that a par value be specified (with
the usual no-par alternative).67 A stockholder who purchases shares
from the corporation must pay at least par value.68As under Delaware
law, promises of future services or future payment may not be used to
satisfy this requirement, but such consideration is acceptable for any
amount to be paid for shares in excess of par value.69 In contrast to
Delaware law, the New York statute expressly provides that treasury
shares may be sold for any amount or form of consideration.70
New York law specifies that consideration received for shares
shall constitute stated capital to the extent of the par value of the
shares issued.71 When no par shares are issued, the entire amount of
the consideration received is deemed to be stated capital unless the
board of directors specifies some lesser amount within 60 days. The
statute requires, however, that some amount must be designated as
stated capital, a requirement that is merely implied in many other
traditional statutes.72 If the corporation issues no par preferred stock,
65

Klang v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers Inc., 702 A.2d 150 (Del. 1997).

66

See See v. Heppenheimer, 61 A. 843, (N.J. Equity 1905).

67

NYBCL 501.

68

NYBCL 504(c).

69

NYBCL 504(h).

70

NYBCL 504(e).

71

NYBCL 506(a).

72

NYBCL 506(b).

21

the entire amount of consideration received for up to the amount of
the liquidation preference for such stock must be deemed to be stated
capital.73 In other words, only the amounts in excess of par value may
be transferred to surplus.
Under New York law, dividends and distributions may be
declared and paid only to the extent of surplus.74 As under Delaware
law, a wasting assets corporation may invade stated capital to the
extent of depletion or amortization but only if stated capital sufficient
to cover liquidation preferences if any is maintained.75 There is no
other general requirement that stated capital be maintained to the
extent of liquidation preferences. Thus, if the corporation issues low
par preferred stock (as opposed to no par preferred stock), the surplus
attributable to such stock may apparently be paid out in dividends
even on common stock. It may be that such limitations are typically
left to negotiation.
California Corporations Code
The California Corporations Code (CCC) relating to legal capital
was thoroughly revised in 1975.76 The concept of par value was
eliminated. A system of dividend regulation based on GAAP was
imposed. There are essentially two alternative tests for dividends.
Under the retained earnings test, a corporation may pay a dividend to
the extent of retained earnings. Under the remaining assets test a
corporation may pay a dividend to the extent that after the dividend
remaining assets will equal at least 125 percent of liabilities and
current assets at least equal current liabilities.77 If average earnings is
less than average interest expense, then current assets must equal at
least 125 percent of current liabilities. In comparing assets and
liabilities certain intangible assets and liabilities are excluded.
California law also imposes an equity insolvency test.78
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California law expressly requires that assets be valued as they
are for financial statement purposes under GAAP.79 In other words, the
corporation must use historical cost rather than fair market value
except to the extent that GAAP permits the use of fair market value.
Repurchase debt is treated as a liability for purposes of testing
subsequent distributions except for distributions in payment of the
repurchase debt itself. This is roughly equivalent to traditional
accounting for treasury stock.
If a corporation has preferred stock outstanding, it may make a
distribution on common stock only if (1) remaining assets are at least
equal to liabilities plus liquidation preferences and (2) retained
earnings are least equal to the proposed distribution plus any
cumulative preferred dividends in arrears. These provisions may be
waived.80
As under the RMBCA, the term distribution is used to refer both
to ordinary dividends and to repurchases. But several types of
repurchases are excluded from the definition of distribution, including
court ordered rescission (presumably including rescission in lieu of
dissolution in a closely held corporation), voluntary rescission where it
is likely to be ordered, and repurchases under an employee stock
ownership plan. The latter two exceptions are nonetheless subject to
the equity solvency test. In contrast, RMBCA 14.34 specifically
requires the application of the distribution tests under RMBCA 6.40 to
any payment in lieu of dissolution.
Under California law a distribution by a subsidiary corporation to
parent stockholders is also deemed to be a distribution by the parent.
Thus, a corporation must use consolidated financial statements to the
extent that GAAP so requires. In contrast, RMBCA 6.40 specifically
permits the use of unconsolidated statements.81
III.

OTHER SOURCES OF CREDITOR PROTECTION

As should be apparent from the foregoing discussion, legal
capital rules in the United States afford little protection to creditors or,
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for that matter, to stockholders. To be sure, stockholders are well
protected by federal securities law in connection with the issuance of
shares by the corporation. While many bondholders also enjoy the
protections of federal securities law (because public offerings of bonds
must be registered), corporation law contains almost nothing that is
designed to protect the interests of creditors. Rather, creditors must
rely primarily on negotiated contractual protections, fraudulent
transfer law, and ultimately the bankruptcy courts to protect
themselves from overreaching for the benefit of stockholders. The
legal capital rules do a somewhat better job of protecting rights as
among various classes of stockholders, though even here preferred
stockholders must depend primarily on privately negotiated contract.
Common stockholders seem to need relatively little protection because
they typically control the board of directors and if anything are on the
receiving end of most questionable transactions.82 Thus, few observers
in the United States are at all unhappy with the demise of the par
value system. Indeed, most would likely agree that the system created
unnecessary legal work and amounted to little more than a trap for the
unwary.
This in not to say, however, that creditors do not enjoy
significant protections under United States law. Indeed, these
protections exist on several levels.
First, corporation law itself affords significant protection by
providing a remedy for the payment of illegal distributions to
stockholders. To be sure, this remedy is ultimately based on the rules
relating to when dividends may be paid, which is to say the legal
capital rules. But in addition to the balance-sheet-based legal capital
rules, every state imposes an equity insolvency test in connection with
the payment of dividends. In other words, a corporation may not make
a distribution when to do so would render the corporation unable to
pay its bills as they become due. In most cases, these rules are found
in the corporation law itself. In some states (such as Delaware) the
rule is imposed by case law or is found in a separate fraudulent
conveyance or fraudulent transfer statute. In short, the law is quite
clear that a corporation may not make a distribution to its stockholders
if to do so would result in the inability of the corporation to pay its
creditors. In the event that a corporation does make an illegal
82
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distribution to its stockholders, the directors are jointly and severally
liable to the corporation for the amount of the dividend in excess of
the legal amount. The directors in turn have a remedy against
stockholders who received the illegal dividend knowing that it was
illegal.83 There are few reported cases involving actions against
directors for illegal distributions. This may be due to a variety of
factors. For one, it may be that the legal capital rules make it too easy
to pay dividends or that the courts have found it difficult to apply the
equity solvency test. It may also be that other remedies are simpler or
more familiar to litigators.
Second, in addition to the rules relating to illegal dividends,
every state has a statute prohibiting fraudulent transfers.84 These
rules are very similar to the rules relating to dividends. In most cases,
they prohibit transfers of property for less than fair value if (1) the
transfer renders the debtor (corporation) unable to pay its bills as they
become due, or (2) the transfer occurs at a time when the debtor
(corporation) is insolvent.85 These rules are considerably broader than
those found in corporation law in several respects. For example, a
creditor has standing to challenge a fraudulent transfer directly. There
is no need to rely on a bankruptcy trustee or to commence a
derivative action on behalf of the corporation. Moreover, a creditor
may recover funds from the transferee.
The problem with fraudulent transfer statutes is that they give
rise to the possibility that some creditors may recover (those who sue)
while others do not. This problem could be avoided by treating such
actions as derivative (for the benefit of the corporation) and permitting
creditors to maintain such actions, but in most states only to
stockholders have standing to maintain a derivative action.86 The same
problem arises in connection with an action against the directors for an
illegal dividend. Generally, corporation law provides that the
corporation may recover for an illegal dividend. And needless to say,
the stockholders as the recipients of the illegal distribution are unlikely
83
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to sue. On the other hand, if the corporation is insolvent or in the
vicinity of insolvency, it appears that a creditor may maintain a
derivative action in some states, including Delaware.87
Practically speaking, it would be unusual for creditors to resort to
a derivative action. The bankruptcy process will ordinarily preempt any
such lawsuit. Once a corporation declares bankruptcy, all legal actions
outside the bankruptcy proceeding are stayed and may proceed only
with the approval of the court and only for the benefit of the bankrupt
estate (the corporation).88 In most cases, a corporation that is on the
verge of insolvency will voluntarily declare bankruptcy in order to
obtain protection from actions by creditors.
It is possible for creditors to force a corporation into bankruptcy
involuntarily, but it is rare.89 It is usually in the interest of the debtor
corporation to control the process, because in most cases incumbent
management will continue to run the company during the course of
the bankruptcy as a debtor-in-possession (DIP). There is no
requirement that a corporation be bankrupt or insolvent in order to file
a bankruptcy petition. Thus, a corporation is free to declare
bankruptcy whenever it wants to do so. And there have been notable
cases in which solvent companies facing substantial contingent
liabilities have sought bankruptcy protection to deal with such claims
in a more orderly fashion. By the same token, a corporation is never
required as a matter of law to file for bankruptcy protection. But
practically speaking a corporation that is threatened with an
involuntary proceeding will almost always file voluntarily first.
The bankruptcy court may appoint a trustee in either a voluntary
or involuntary case if a party so moves, but a trustee is likely to be
appointed only upon a showing of fraud, dishonesty, mismanagement,
or incompetence.90 Still, in most cases in which it appears that the
corporation has paid an illegal dividend, it is likely that a trustee will
be appointed. And if a trustee is appointed, the trustee may maintain
an action on behalf of the corporation to recover it. In such a case
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there is no need for a derivative action. The action by the trustee
amounts to the same thing.
Indeed, there have been numerous cases in recent years in
which a bankruptcy trustee has sought to recover illegal distributions
from directors, recipient stockholders, and the agents through which
the distributions were paid.91 Most of these cases have been
unsuccessful because bankruptcy law precludes the recovery of
settlement payments in connection with transactions in securities and
commodities.92 Specifically, this provision exempts payments made
through the payment and settlement system relating to transactions in
securities and commodities. (The rationale is that unwinding such
payments could cause massive disruptions in the financial system that
would undermine many subsequent transactions involving the cash
from the original transaction.) In practice, this rule is not likely to
apply except to publicly traded corporations, because only such
corporations have shares that clear through the clearance and
settlement system.
In summary, the rules relating to illegal distributions and
fraudulent transfers are usually enforced within a bankruptcy
proceeding when they are enforced. Such claims are assets of the
bankrupt corporation and must be marshaled as other assets. These
claims are usually litigated by the trustee as a separate case in a state
or federal court of general jurisdiction rather than in the bankruptcy
court. It is also possible for a variety of remedies contained within the
Bankruptcy Code itself to come into play. For example, the Bankruptcy
Code contains its own parallel fraudulent transfer provision.93 The
Bankruptcy Code also contains additional remedies – such as the
ability to avoid preferential transfers within the previous year – that
may often obviate the need to resort to the law relating to illegal
dividends or fraudulent transfers.94 Nevertheless, these laws are
subject to the same limitations discussed above when the payment is
made through the clearance and settlement system.
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Yet another doctrine that may apply in many cases is equitable
subordination. For example, where a stockholder has resold shares to
the corporation in exchange for a note or has attempted to extract
funds from the corporation by reducing a claim for salary or wages or
other purported obligations to a judgment or promissory note, a
bankruptcy court (or other court) may subordinate such claims to
those of bona fide creditors on various grounds.95
It is also quite common for a corporation's creditors with
unsatisfied claims to seek to pierce the corporate veil and to hold
individual stockholders liable for the debts of the corporation
notwithstanding the fact that corporation law expressly provides that
stockholders shall have no personal liability for the obligations of the
corporation.96 Although the law relating to piercing is confused, such
cases almost always involve fraud or undercapitalization.97 It should be
emphasized that piercing is different from equitable subordination in
that in a successful piercing case, a defendant stockholder (or
sometimes a director or officer) is held liable to the plaintiff creditor for
the debts of the corporation personally. In a subordination claim, a
stockholder-creditor (or other creditor) is simply made to wait to be
paid until after other creditors have been paid. There are no reported
cases of piercing in which the stockholders of a publicly held
corporation have been held liable personally for the debts of the
corporation.98 But there have been numerous cases in which creditors

95

See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939);
In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980); Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir.
1958). The courts may also subordinate the claims of otherwise legitimate creditors who have
attempted to gain priority over other creditors. For example, where a bank lends funds to a
corporation in order to permit the corporation to buy back its own shares, knowing that the
corporation may be rendered insolvent as a result and the lender has taken a security interest in
connection with the loan, the security interest may be nullified and the claim in effect
subordinated to those of other lenders.
96

My own search of the Lexis database, indicates that there were more than 400 such reported
cases in 2004 alone.
97

See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
See generally Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate
Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. 379 (1999). See also Richard A. Booth,
Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 140, 147 (1994).
98

Some scholars have proposed that limited liability should be abolished and that stockholders of
even publicly traded corporations should be personally liable for the excess debts of the
corporations in which they invest.

28

of publicly held corporations have been threatened credibly with
having their claims subordinated.99
An emerging doctrine that is closely related to piercing is the
doctrine of successor liability. Most cases of successor liability involve
either a purported sale of assets without assumption of liabilities or the
continuation of an existing business under a new name. Many of these
cases involve an attempt to escape products liability claims or
environmental cleanup costs. Many also involve the sale of assets at a
discount from fair market value, which tends to suggest that both
seller and buyer were aware of contingent claims.100
In a closely held corporation, these doctrines (as well as
fraudulent transfer law) effectively require a stockholder to insure that
the corporation is adequately capitalized in light of the needs of the
business. There is, however, very little law relating to how much
capital is enough or even what constitutes capital.101 Nevertheless,
there has been no suggestion in recent years that corporation law
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should reinstate any specific capital requirements. Thus, it appears
that most corporation law scholars and practitioners see the
admittedly vague requirements implicit in the common law as
preferable to a bright-line standard that would undoubtedly be wrong
for individual businesses much more often than it would be right.
Although the foregoing remedies serve to protect the interests of
creditors, they generally do not require that a corporation take positive
steps to protect the interests of creditors even when the corporation is
on the verge of insolvency. For example, it is quite common in the
context of a struggling business for a stockholder to lend additional
capital to the business in an effort to save it but also in an effort to
avoid putting more equity capital at risk. The courts have almost
always treated such stockholder loans as bona fide creditor claims at
least where the business appears to have been adequately capitalized
in the first place.102
On the other hand, in recent years, the courts have begun to
recognize that when a corporation is operating on the edge of
insolvency, the board of directors assumes a fiduciary duty to protect
the interests of creditors.103 It is not completely clear what the duty to
creditors entails or when it is triggered.104 It might be argued that the
duty is one primarily to preserve assets for the benefit of creditors. Or
it might be argued that the board of directors remains free to pursue
risky strategies that may entail losses for creditors, but should not
undertake transactions for the benefit of the stockholders at the
expense of creditors.
Thus, some courts have limited the duty to creditors. For
example, one court, in applying Delaware law, has limited the duty to
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See Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (CA5 1941).
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See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 Del Ch.
LEXIS 215; Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Cap.
Group (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956 (D. Del. 1994); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In
re Healthco Int'l Inc.), 208 B.R. 288 (D. Mass. 1997) (applying Delaware law).
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See Geyer v. Ingersoll Pubs. Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-88 (Del. Ch. 1992) (in determining when
duty attaches Delaware law is concerned with insolvency in fact rather than insolvency as defined
by a statutory filing). The prevailing view appears to be that the duty may be triggered somewhat
before the appointment of a receiver or trustee. See Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449; 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7818 (SDNY 2003) (under Delaware law, directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty
to the corporation's creditors at a point short of actual insolvency, that is, when the corporation is
in the vicinity of insolvency).

30

situations where directors of an insolvent corporation diverted
corporate assets for the benefit of insiders or preferred creditors.105
CONCLUSION
Although United States legal capital rules once imposed
significant requirements in connection with the amount of capital that
must be contributed to and maintained in a corporation, those rules
have lost virtually all of their significance and force for stockholders
and creditors alike. Today, creditors must rely primarily on negotiated
contractual protections, as augmented by a variety of statutory and
common law protections. This system appears to work reasonably
well, however, in that limited liability entities, which are entirely
devoid of legal capital rules, have proliferated in recent years, and do
not appear to be disfavored in the credit markets. The story is slightly
different in connection with maintenance of capital, where solvency
requirements appear to have real effect in regulating distributions to
stockholders. Moreover, in practice such rules are equally applicable in
the form of fraudulent transfer statutes to unincorporated entities.
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See In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, 225 B.R. 646, 655-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) ("Creditors
have a right to expect that directors will not divert, dissipate or unduly risk assets necessary to
satisfy their claims. That is the appropriate scope of duty that exists only to protect the contractual
and priority rights of creditors."). See also Bank of America v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792,
799-800 (E.D. Va. 2002) (applying Virginia law but referring to Delaware law) (individual creditor
could not recover its own debt from officers and directors of an insolvent corporation absent selfdealing or other illegal conduct).
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